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Conventional wisdom suggests that strong domestic institutions, measured by indicators 
of good governance, the rule of law, and the protection of property rights, provide an 
effective first layer of protection for foreign investors. However, empirical studies reveal 
that democratic host countries (which on average tend to have stronger domestic 
institutions) are more likely to conclude international investment agreements (IIAs) than 
more autocratic countries.
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 Furthermore, recent analyses covering trends since the late 
1970s suggest that democratic countries are more likely to agree to stricter IIA provisions 
related to binding investor-state dispute settlement and pre-establishment national 
treatment than autocratic countries. Specifically, the likelihood that host countries will 
conclude IIAs with strict dispute settlement and national treatment provisions increases 
by about 10% for every step from autocracy to democracy (based on the seven-grade 
scale of Freedom House).
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 In other words, democratic governments tie their hands 
particularly tightly in IIAs, even though their domestic framework alone offers security 
for foreign investors.  
 
Political scientists focusing on international trade agreements have an intriguing 
explanation to offer; democracies are more likely to conclude international agreements on 
trade liberalization, in line with the preferences of median voters, since such agreements 
promote economic growth and, hence, improve policymakers’ chances for re-election.3 
However, this theory is unlikely to hold in the context of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and IIAs. Compared to trade liberalization, it is less clear what efficient economic policy 
means in this context. It is hardly disputed that trade agreements stimulate exports and 
imports between the partners, while empirical evidence is highly ambiguous on whether 
IIAs are effective in promoting FDI flows to host countries entering into binding 
commitments. Moreover, the view that trade is good for growth may be hardly contested, 
but it seems less clear under which conditions FDI will benefit host countries. Skeptics 
argue that productivity-enhancing effects of inward FDI are least likely where needed 
most, namely in poor host countries with insufficient endowment of complementary local 
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factors of production. Nevertheless, poor democratic host countries appear to be as eager 
as more advanced democracies to participate in the IIA boom. 
 
Political scientists and economists are currently not able to provide definite answers to 
the question of why democracies sign more and stricter IIAs. One might ponder a purely 
“technical” explanation: the correlation between democracy and increasingly strict IIAs 
could be a statistical artifact, rather than a causal relationship, considering the 
coincidence between the longer-term trend toward democratization in large parts of the 
world and the mushrooming of bilateral investment treaties. However, recent analyses 
focusing on investment provisions concluded in the context of preferential trade 
agreements corroborate significant effects of democracy. Alternatively, democracies may 
simply be more likely to engage in all forms of international co-operation since they see 
themselves as “good citizens” of the international system. Such unobserved heterogeneity 
is difficult to control for in the typical research designs employing observational data 
since it may change over time. 
 
Another possible explanation would be more embarrassing for democratic governments. 
Their short-sightedness and preoccupation with upcoming elections may render them 
prone to bounded rationality.
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 Accordingly, host-country governments tend to ignore the 
“high-impact, low-probability costs” of IIA-related disputes as long as they themselves 
have not been brought to international arbitration by foreign investors claiming a breach 
of IIA provisions. As UNCTAD attests, the number of such cases has soared recently. 
What is more, more cases have been brought against democratic host countries than 
against autocratic host countries. Although the number of cases does not necessarily 
imply higher costs of investment disputes for democracies, it does indicate that it may 
have been naïve for democratic governments to think that they had little to fear from IIAs.  
 
It remains open to debate whether democracies are more short-sighted than autocracies. 
For one, a refined cost-benefit balance of FDI provisions would be required to assess the 
economic rationality of IIAs. Furthermore, democracy may be too broad a concept to 
reveal the complexities under specific governance structures, e.g., there may be 
differences between parliamentary and presidential democracies. Finally, unidirectional 
causality from governance structures to international rule making is difficult to establish. 
New insights may be gained if mainly democratic governments disengage from the global 
IIA regime by concluding fewer and weaker FDI provisions in the future, or attempt to 
renegotiate existing ones. In this context, it is telling that investor-state dispute settlement 
plays a big part in the controversy around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership negotiations between the United States and the European Union. 
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